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A. INTRODUCTION: THE NEED FOR REFORM
Copyright law reform is in the air.  A European Commission staff working paper 
on the review of EU legislation on Copyright and Related Rights, issued for 
consultation in July 2004,1 assesses, in particular, whether any inconsistencies 
between the different Directives hamper the operation of EU copyright law or 
damage the balance between rights holders’ interests, those of users and 
consumers and those of the European economy as a whole. The working paper 
concludes that there is no need for root and branch revision of the existing 
Directives but that fine-tuning is necessary to ensure that definitions – for 
example of reproduction right - are consistent. Similar updating is thought 
necessary with respect to the exceptions and limitations set out in the different 
Directives.  The working paper also assesses whether further legislative or other 
action is needed to ensure the Internal Market functions properly, and concludes 
that the immediate need for action may be limited to achieving a “level playing 
field” on the criteria used to determine the beneficiaries of protection in the field 
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of related rights.  It may be significant, however, that the Consultation Paper 
appears to envisage a future ‘Copyright Code’ for Europe, in which the present 
piecemeal collection of Directives enacted at various times since 1991 will be 
consolidated and, presumably, the gaps between them filled: “the Commission,” we 
are told, “is working towards its objective of completing the consolidation of the 
acquis communautaire in its most authoritative form – codification”.2   The process 
will apparently involve first the Software, Rental Right and Term Directives.
In the United Kingdom, the Labour Party’s manifesto for the 2005 general 
election included the following commitment: 
Copyright in a digital age: We will modernise copyright and other forms 
of protection of intellectual property rights so that they are appropriate for 
the digital age.  We will use our Presidency of the EU to look at how to 
ensure content creators can protect their innovations in a digital age.  
Piracy is a growing threat and we will work with industry to protect against 
it. 3
The reference here to the Presidency of the European Union, to be held by 
Britain in the second half of 2005, is especially significant against the background 
of the Commission’s consultation in 2004.  The emphasis falls on protection of 
                                                
2 Ibid, para 1.3 (last internal para). 
3 Britain Forward Not Back: The Labour Party Manifesto 2005, accessible at 
http://www.labour.org.uk/fileadmin/manifesto_13042005_a3/flash/manifesto_200
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intellectual property rights against the “threat” of “piracy”; the Labour Party reform 
agenda is clearly one in which strengthening intellectual property is the way to 
respond to “the digital age”. 
After Labour had been returned to government at the election in May 
2005, James Purnell, the new Minister of Creative Industries and Tourism at the 
Department of Culture Media and Sport (DCMS), said the following in a speech 
delivered on 16 June: 
I can announce today that DTI and DCMS will set up a joint project to 
implement our manifesto commitment [i.e. the one just quoted] chaired by 
Lord Sainsbury and myself.  We will examine in the first place what issues 
need to be addressed, including the key issue of Digital Rights 
Management and the interoperability of new technologies.  Obviously the 
primary role is for industry, which is why we have asked the Creative 
Industries IP Forum to advise us on this.4  
We may note here that the Creative Industries Forum on Intellectual Property is a 
cross-Government body (including the devolved administrations and also 
industry representatives), set up by DCMS in July 2004.   The Forum’s task was 
to consider how best to meet the “opportunities and threats that rapid 
                                                





technological developments are generating for the UK's Creative Industries 
sector”.5  
Purnell’s speech was non-committal on the shape reform might take, but 
he did add this:
To attract creative companies, they need to know that we have an IP 
regime that will allow them to make returns on their creativity and to invest 
in innovation.  Bands like Coldplay will make enough money for their 
company to help them discover around 50 to 100 bands.  At the same 
time, an information rich society needs an easy exchange of ideas – after 
all, creativity often comes from collaboration, from putting existing ideas 
together in new ways.  So, we need an IP framework that balances the 
needs of consumers, creators and businesses. 
The Minister’s first and foremost point is, then, the need to produce an 
intellectual property law which supports economic returns on creativity and 
innovation, from which, it is argued, investment in more creativity and innovation 
will be generated – a virtuous circle indeed.  While the speech does refer at the 
end of the quoted passage to the need for balance in intellectual property rights, 
the needs of industry, particularly the creative industries, are emphasised more –
                                                




“obviously” the “primary role” in developing proposals for reform lies with 
industry.  
Further, the Creative Industries IP Forum in which this primary role was to 
be discharged is a body the membership of which is dominated by 
representatives of the industries concerned.  The Consumers Association is 
included, but whether that body can adequately represent the interests of all non-
industry stakeholders with regard to the output of the creative industries –
education and research interests, for example – is at least debatable.  Neither 
the publicly available minutes of meetings of the Forum, nor the reports of its 
working groups published in October 2005, suggest that such interests have 
featured prominently – or indeed at all – in its deliberations.6  The concerns of 
consumers, or users of intellectual property, also appear as little more than an 
afterthought in Purnell’s speech, and really only in so far as they are potential 
creators themselves. 
Amongst the many developments which have thus brought copyright 
reform to the fore in the UK and Europe may be included the following:
                                                
6 The recommendations of the Creative Industries IP Forum working groups – a 
charter against online infringement and a stiffening of law and sentencing in 
relation to “IP crime” - and the Government’s cautiously non-committal response 
thereto are available, along with two sets of Forum meeting minutes, at 
http://www.culture.gov.uk/creative_industries/ip_forum.htm.    
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 File-sharing through unlicensed peer-to-peer networks, especially 
with regard to sound recordings, but also in relation to computer 
software and games, and increasingly in relation to films as well.7  
 Sound recording industry pressure to replace the term for the 
protection of sound recordings (currently 50 years from release) 
with a term the same as that in the USA (i.e. 95 years from the year
of first publication).8
 Open access, or author-pays, publishing of scholarly and scientific 
journals (that is, authors or, more usually, their research funders 
pay to publish their articles in a journal; publishers send the articles 
out for peer review; articles of a sufficiently high standard are edited 
and published; and the journal is disseminated free of charge, 
primarily online). First recommended by the Wellcome Trust, a 
leading funder of research, in 2003,9 and later supported in a 
Report of the House of Commons Science and Technology Select 
                                                
7 See C Waelde and H MacQueen, ‘From Entertainment to Education: the Scope 
of Copyright’, [2004] Intellectual Property Quarterly 259, reviewing the current 
debate down to April 2004.  Since then the major developments are the growth of 
licensed downloading sites, increased numbers of actions against individual 
downloaders, and the decisions against the operators of unlicensed file-sharing 
networks made by the US Supreme Court in MGM v Grokster 545 US 000 
(2005), and the Federal Court of Australia in Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v 
Sharman License Holdings Ltd [2005] FCA 1242. 
8 See BBC News Online 26 July 2004, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/music/3925975.stm; 10 August 2004, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/music/3547788.stm
9 Wellcome Trust, An Economic Analysis of Scientific Research Publishing
(2003); Costs and Business Models in Scientific Research Publishing (2004), 
both accessible at http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/doc_WTD002766.html. 
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Committee published in July 2004,10 the idea was thereafter rather 
negatively received by government.11  Since then, however, 
Research Councils UK, the collective body of the eight councils 
providing public funding for research in Britain, has moved towards 
making it mandatory for research papers arising from Council-
funded work to be deposited in openly available repositories.12
 The establishment of Creative Commons UK (building on a US 
model), with the aim of developing forms of licence under which 
copyright is retained but users are given advance permission to 
copy and distribute the work for their own purposes so long as due 
credit is given to the original work; this being, it is argued, the most 
appropriate way to support and encourage creativity and innovation 
in the on-line and digital environments.13   
                                                
10 Scientific Publications: Free for All? (Tenth Report 2003-2004, HC 399), 





0006.htm#a1. For the Committee’s response, a further Report published in 
November 2004, see Scientific Publications: Free for All? – the Government’s 
Response (Fourteenth Report 2003-2004, HC 1200) 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmsctech/1200/12
0002.htm. 
12 See RCUK Position Statement on Access to Research Outputs (June 2005), 
accessible at http://www.rcuk.ac.uk/access/index.asp.  For a further press 
release on the subject in September 2005, see 
http://www.rcuk.ac.uk/press/20050921rcuk.asp. 
13 See http://creativecommons.org/projects/international/uk/; there is also a site 
for Scotland (http://creativecommons.org/worldwide/scotland/). 
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 The publication of the Adelphi Charter on creativity, innovation and 
intellectual property in October 2005,14 calling upon governments to 
maintain a balance between public domain and private right, and 
between competition and monopoly, with regard to intellectual 
property rights in general; to ensure in particular that the copyright 
term is limited in time and does not extend beyond what is 
proportionate and necessary; and to facilitate a wide range of 
policies to stimulate access and innovation, including non-
proprietary models such as open source software licensing and 
open access to scientific literature. 
There are also widespread perceptions in many sectors, ranging from 
disaffected teenagers to judges15 and elderly professors, of copyright as 
complex, inaccessible, productive of difficulty and uncertainty in relation to 
otherwise lawful activities, and sometimes absurd.  About to watch the film Lost 
in Translation (possibly a very apt title in the circumstances), I heard a ripple of 
laughter pass through the audience in an Edinburgh cinema as a “short” by the 
Federation Against Copyright Theft warned us all in baleful fashion against trying 
to use our mobile phones or video cameras to take photographs or other images 
from what we were about to see.  The prevalence of such derision for the law is 
                                                
14 Accessible at http://www.adelphicharter.org/. 
15 For whom see in particular H Laddie, ‘Copyright: Over-strength, Over-
regulated, Over-rated?’, [1996] 17 EIPR 253; R Jacob, ‘The Onward March of 
Intellectual Property Rights and Remedies’, in R Dreyfuss, D Zimmerman and ? 
First (eds), Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy 
for the Knowledge Society (2001), 415. 
9
9
not helped by the further perception that copyright is in fact widely flaunted, 
whether deliberately or ignorantly, or, amongst those minded to comply if they 
can (such as academics), as a result of practical inability to find out whether 
copyright exists in a given piece of work and, if so, who its owner is.
A huge range of areas of activity is affected by copyright – government, 
entertainment, education, creativity, technology and international development, to 
name but a few.  As the short list of major issues given above suggests, much of 
the current debate has arisen in the context of the ever-expanding scope and 
possibilities of digital, wireless and mobile technologies for the creation, 
dissemination and reproduction of ideas, information and entertainment.  The 
ability to make material available so that it is potentially always accessible to 
users at times and places chosen by them, along with expanding possibilities of, 
and demand for, interactivity between suppliers and users, has transformed the 
context for policy thinking in the areas traditionally covered by copyright.
So the need for reform is apparent – but it is not necessarily the case that 
the “primary role” in developing this reform should be for industry.  Indeed, as 
Jessica Litman has pointed out from the US experience of copyright law-making, 
real problems are inherent in an approach to reform taking the self-perceived 
needs of industry as paramount.  In the spirit of creative commons, I simply quote 
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in extenso the key relevant passages from her book Digital Copyright, published 
in 2001:16
About one hundred years ago, Congress got into the habit of revising 
copyright law by encouraging representatives of the industries affected by 
copyright to hash out among themselves what changes needed to be 
made and then present Congress with the text of appropriate legislation.  
By the 1920s, the process was sufficiently entrenched that whenever a 
member of Congress came up with a legislative proposal without going 
through the cumbersome prelegislative process of multiparty negotiation, 
the affected industries united to block the bill.  Copyright bills passed only 
after private stakeholders agreed with one another on their substantive 
provisions.  The pattern has continued to this day.
A process like this generates legislation with some predictable features.  
First of all, no affected party is going to agree to support a bill that leaves it 
worse off than it is under current law. … Second, there’s a premium on 
characterizing the state of current law to favour one’s own position, since 
current law is the baseline against which proposals are negotiated. … 
Third, the way these things tend to get settled in the real world is by 
                                                
16 Note that Litman had already set out much more detailed arguments on these 
issues in ‘Copyright, Compromise and Legislative History’ (1987) 72 Cornell LR 
857 and ‘Copyright Legislation and Technological Change’ (1989) 68 Oregon LR
275.  For a powerful review of Litman’s book see Jane C Ginsburg ‘Can 
Copyright Become User-Friendly?’ (2001-2002) 25 Columbia-VLA J L & Arts 71.
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specifying. … As the entertainment and information markets have gotten 
more complicated, the copyright law has gotten longer, more specific, and 
harder to understand.17  
Anyone who has grappled with the US Copyright Act will appreciate what Litman 
means.  Later on, she elaborates her final point:
A process that relies upon negotiated bargains among industry 
representatives, however, is ill-suited to arrive at general flexible 
limitations.  The dynamics of interindustry negotiations tend to encourage 
fact-specific solutions to interindustry disputes.  The participants’ 
frustration with the rapid aging of narrowly defined rights inspired them to 
collaborate in drafting rights more broadly but no comparable tendency 
emerged to inject breadth or flexibility into the provisions limiting those 
rights.18 … If negotiated copyright statutes turn out to be so unworkable, 
why is it that Congress continues to rely on private interests to work out 
the text of bills?  One reason may be … [that] the participants are the 
people who will have to order their day-to-day business relations with one 
another around the provisions of the legislation. … The process permits a 
give-and-take among a wide field of players whose competing interests 
are exceedingly complex. … Putting all of  them into a room and asking 
them not to come out until they have agreed to be bound by the same 
                                                
17 Digital Copyright (2001), 23-25.
18 Ibid, 58. 
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rules may be the most efficient approach to formulating law that will work 
well enough for each of them, although not necessarily for the rest of us.19
This last phrase leads Litman to her most potent objection to the reform process 
she is describing:
The need to balance concessions in order to achieve agreement, of 
course, imposes constraints on the sort of legislation that is likely to 
emerge from the process.  Unless the participants become convinced that 
the new legislation gives them no fewer benefits than they currently enjoy, 
they are likely to press for additional concessions.  It must therefore be 
expected that any successful copyright legislation will confer advantages 
on many of the interests involved in hammering it out, and that these 
advantages will probably come at some absent party’s expense. … It is 
the seeming inevitability of bias against absent interests, and of narrow 
compromises with no durability, that makes such a process so costly.  
Each time we rely on current stakeholders to agree on a statutory scheme 
they produce a scheme designed to protect themselves against the rest of 
us.  Its rigidity leads to its breakdown: the statute’s drafters have 
incorporated too few general principles to guide courts in effecting repairs. 
…20
                                                
19 Ibid, 61




Negotiations among current stakeholders tend to produce laws that 
resolve existing interindustry disputes with detailed and specific statutory 
language, which rapidly grows obsolete.  Such laws consign the disputes 
of the future to resolution under models biased in favour of the status quo.  
A copyright law cannot make sensible provision for the growth of 
technology unless it incorporates both the flexibility to make adjustments 
and the general principles to guide courts in the directions those 
adjustments should take.  The negotiation process that has dominated 
copyright revision throughout this century, however, is ill adapted to 
generate that flexibility.  It cannot therefore be expected to produce 
statutes that improve with age.21
When I first read Litman’s analysis, my initial reaction was that the history 
of copyright revision in the United Kingdom had been different.  Each of the 
1911, 1956 and 1988 Acts was preceded, not by a process of inter-industry 
bargaining, but by an independent committee or commission chaired by a 
relatively neutral figure such as an eminent judge, which heard and weighed 
evidence (of course often contentious in nature), and then made what appeared 
at least to be neutral and balanced assessments and recommendations, leading 
to wide-ranging overall legislation that tended to stand unaltered (but adaptably 
                                                
21 Ibid, 63. Ginsburg (note 16 above) describes Litman’s conclusion on this point 
as “unassailable” (at 73). 
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so) for periods of thirty to forty years.22  However, further reflection suggested 
that in the last decade of the twentieth century that kind of deliberative reform 
process had been displaced by a piecemeal, issue-driven approach within the 
European Union, which certainly came much closer to the US experience 
analysed by Litman.  One thought, for example, of the succession of Directives 
each focused on relatively narrow aspects of copyright - Software, Rental Right, 
Term, Broadcasting, Databases, Artists’ Resale Right, and the various topics 
covered in the Information Society Directive - and the often slow-moving, yet 
sometimes clamorous, debates, industry special pleading and lobbying, and 
often rather messy compromises (sometimes reached under political and time 
pressures) which led up to their eventual enactment. 
The copyright Part of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 as 
frequently amended and added to as a result of all these Directives now stretches 
to about 200 sections, to say nothing of various Regulations containing substantive 
provisions but not incorporated into the main Act.  It is worth remembering, 
however, that, as originally presented, the 1988 Act got through most of the 
                                                
22 For the 1911 Act see the Gorell Report of the Committee on the Law of 
Copyright (Cd 4976,1909); for the 1956 Act, the Gregory Report on the Law of 
Copyright (Cmd 8662, 1952); and for the 1988 Act , the Whitford Report, 
Copyright and Designs Law (Cmnd 6732, 1977).  John Gorell Barnes was 
President of the Probate Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court and 
was promoted to the House of Lords as Baron Gorell of Brampton in the same 
year as the publication of his copyright report. Sir Henry Stanley Gregory KCMG 
was an eminent civil servant.  Mr Justice Whitford was for many years one of the 
Patent Judges in the Chancery Division of the High Court.  Note also the Royal 
Commission on Copyright (C-2036, 1878), chaired initially by Lord Stanhope, a 
prominent Tory peer and historian, and, after his death in 1875, by Lord John 
Manners, the Postmaster-General in the then Conservative government. 
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fundamental principles of copyright in about thirty, basically technology-neutral, 
sections, with the bulk of the remainder being made up of very fact- or sector-
specific exceptions, Copyright Tribunal rules, and criminal law and qualification 
provisions.  Moral rights, which might be thought of as part of the fundamentals 
now,23 were also found in this miscellaneous bundle of material; but since the 1988 
Act was introducing the whole concept of moral rights for the first time in British 
copyright law, this inconspicuous position was not altogether surprising.  The 
presentation of even the first thirty sections of the Act has, however, now become 
exceptionally messy thanks to their frequent adjustment in compliance with 
European Union requirements.  
There is, then, a powerful argument, in the interest of letting people know
what the law is in a matter affecting many aspects of everyday life, for producing a 
new but short Copyright Act stating the basic legal rules in an orderly, principled 
and accessible manner, leaving detailed regulation, where necessary, (e.g. specific 
exceptions for libraries, archives, the disabled, and public administration; or 
Copyright Tribunal jurisdiction and procedure; or the rules about qualification for 
protection), to statutory instruments (which should themselves nevertheless also be 
orderly, principled and accessible to those whom they affect).  In all probability, 
such a short Copyright Act ought to be produced for the European Union, and not 
just for the United Kingdom.  But there is no reason why the United Kingdom 
                                                
23 See further below, 000. 
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cannot take an initiative in this area, especially when the reforms in the air already 
envisage some form of European codification as an ultimate goal.  
Such an initiative should not be undertaken, however, without careful 
preliminary consideration of the nature of the exercise upon which one is 
embarking.  The remainder of this paper highlights two issues which would go to 
the heart of a recodification or restatement of copyright, namely the underlying 
fundamental policies or purposes of the law and the definition of the zone for 
copyright in relation to other forms of intellectual property right, and, indeed, to 
other rights such as exist under legislation about freedom of information and the re-
use of public sector information (the problem of cumulation).  
B. THE PURPOSE(S) OF COPYRIGHT
A fundamental question in thinking through systematic reform and codification is 
the purpose – or purposes - of copyright.  Only with clear ideas of what we are 
trying to achieve will clear, coherent and principled law emerge. 
(1) Economic interests
Copyright’s economic purpose, the incentivisation and rewarding, in accordance 
with market demand, of those involved in the creation and publication of certain 
17
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kinds of work, is traditionally emphasised in the United Kingdom.24  James 
Purnell’s speech in June 2005 shows that this idea is still dominant.  In the 
European Union the rhetoric of the copyright reform process is also dominated by 
economic interests and the drive to complete the single market.  These economic 
interests include, not only creators, but also entrepreneurs who convert what is 
created into products for the marketplace.  Copyright is seen primarily as a 
response to market failure; without it, the expression of ideas and information, 
creativity and innovation would be available to all without reward for those who 
invested in the creation and dissemination of the works thereby produced.       
However, the digital environment now raises the question whether the 
economic interests of the creator and entrepreneur, or of society, still actually 
require copyright.  The technology allows the building into products – and also 
into the hardware needed to play the products - of digital rights management 
systems (DRMS) and technological protection measures (TPMs) that prevent 
unauthorised access and use unless and until such contractual conditions as the 
producer imposes (typically payment by way of credit card or fund transfer 
systems such as Paypal, and carefully restricted re-use), are met by the would-
be user.  Usually such DRMS are seen by critics hostile to current legal 
developments in the field as the manifestation of the worst of copyright, since 
                                                
24 There is a large number of economic studies of copyright, reaching a wide 
range of conclusions.  A useful general survey is W R Cornish and D Llewelyn, 
Intellectual Property (5th edn, 2003), pp. 35-41, 373-380.  Recent detailed works 
include R Towse (ed), Copyright and the Creative Industries (2002); W Landes 
and R Posner, The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights (2003); M Einhorn, 
Media, Technology and Copyright (2004). 
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they can enable the prevention of use falling within the exceptions to copyright 
and indeed, the protection of works no longer or never in copyright.  The position 
of the owner thus appears to be considerably strengthened at the expense of the 
user.25  Equally, however, through contracts such as the forms provided by 
Creative Commons, an author can indicate in advance, as it were, those uses of 
the work by others which are permitted, and require those using this method to 
apply those terms and conditions to further downstream sub-users.  So in this 
context DRMS can operate in support of widespread use and later creativity with 
existing works.  There is some evidence that in response to consumer demand 
right-owners are beginning to explore the possibilities of enabling consumers, 
through DRMS, to make use of their products other than simply playing them (for 
example, making additional copies to store on personal computers or playback 
machines).  Further market pressures may lead to more such developments, 
particularly if different consumers might be prepared to pay variable prices for 
different packages of permissions made available through DRMS.  Contract will 
therefore often be automated and “standard form” in this context, rather than the 
result of individual negotiation and bargaining; but none the less, given its 
enormous flexibility, can it replace copyright, and would that be a good thing?26  
                                                
25 L M C R Guibault, Copyright Limitations and Contracts (2002).  See e.g. the 
decision of the Paris District Court, Perquin et UFC Que Choisir v SA Films Alain 
Sarde, Sté Universal Pictures Video France et al (“DVD Copy”), 30 April 2004, in 
which the use of TPMs to defeat the legislative permission for private copying 
was held legitimate; and further the commentary of Christophe Geiger, (2005) 36 
IIC 148. 
26 There are of course issues about such matters as the equivalents to copyright 
term and exceptions in this model: these are dealt with below. 
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An obvious tricky point is that it is copyright, for the most part, which, at 
least initially, creates the subject-matter around which contracting parties can 
subsequently bargain.  In the absence of copyright at the point of creation there 
might be no room for bargaining at all.  In particular, the individual author/creator 
without access to the means of sophisticated technological protection, 
dissemination and online payment methods would be at a serious disadvantage 
without copyright.  One could of course try to create some sort of “fair contract” or 
“minimum terms” regime for such authors, perhaps akin in some way to the 
voluntary Code of Practice already operated in the United Kingdom by the 
Publishers Association,27 or to the German publishers’ contract law found in that 
country’s Copyright Act and significantly amended only in 2002.28  But these 
instruments assume the existence of copyright; and the “minimum contract” that 
would have to be created in the absence of copyright might end up looking 
remarkably similar to copyright. 
Further, the economic interests protected by copyright are not limited to 
those of the author/creator of the work and the entrepreneur who first takes it to 
market.  Since the economic rights protected by copyright are freely transferable 
to third parties, the person who at any given moment owns the copyright and 
reaps the economic returns it gives, may well be someone who had no hand in 
                                                
27 Accessible at the Publishers Association website, 
http://www.publishers.org.uk/paweb/paweb.nsf/pubframe!Open.  See further 
Cornish and Llewelyn, Intellectual Property (5th edn, 2003), 486-7. 
28 See discussion in W R Cornish ‘The Author as Risk-Taker’ (2002-2003) 26 
Columbia-VLA J L & Arts 1. 
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the original production of the work or the product flowing from it.  How far such 
investors may deserve the same level of protection as the originators of the work 
is a nice question: after all, they are risk-takers to a greater extent than those 
from whom they bought the rights, and they have helped to ensure that the 
author/creator/first producer does indeed earn reward from their work.  We could 
of course ban outright transfers of copyright,29 but licensing would still be 
necessary to secure the author’s reward; while a licensee would certainly require 
some incentive in its own right to make the investment in a licence worthwhile.
Another economic interest is that of the employer whose employees 
create copyright works in the course of their employment, and who under United 
Kingdom law (but not other Continental laws) gets first ownership of the resulting 
copyrights.  Given that the employer is an investor who is backing the production 
of copyright works, his gaining the copyright (at least in its economic aspects) 
and the return therefrom does not seem so dreadful as sometimes suggested by 
those from systems more focused on copyright as reflecting more of personality 
rights than economic interests.30
(2) Personality and cultural interests
Even in the United Kingdom, however, copyright’s purposes are not limited to the 
protection and advancement of economic interests.  The cultural dimension to 
                                                
29 As with moral rights: see below, 000. 




copyright is apparent in the nature of what it protects – literary, dramatic, musical 
and artistic works, films, sound recordings and broadcasts – and in the length of 
time for which it gives that protection, which is not necessarily (or at all) driven by 
economic analysis.  More subtly, the variable term as between author and media 
works also reflects cultural judgments, giving a higher value to “pure” authorship 
than to exploitation of technology.  In any event, it is clear that the length of 
protection considerably exceeds what is needed to incentivise authors and 
producers, and that most works will have an economic life considerably shorter 
than their copyright terms.  
But copyright’s cultural purpose is most evident in the moral rights.  These
recognise inalienable, non-economic interests that an author (but no-one else) 
may continue to exercise in respect of a work even though no longer owner of 
the copyright or of the physical form in which the work was first created and 
recorded.  There are two major rights recognised in the present United Kingdom 
law,31 as follows: 
 Paternity32:  the right to be identified as author of a literary, 
dramatic, musical or artistic work, or as director of a copyright film;
                                                
31 See below, 000, for the prospective introduction of artists’ resale rights from 1 
January 2006.
32 In a world of gender neutrality this right might be better re-named the 
attribution right.  But gender neutrality is not always well understood in non-
Anglophone parts of the world. 
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 Integrity: the right of such authors and directors to prevent 
derogatory treatment of their work; 
Inalienability means that these rights cannot be the subject of commerce in 
themselves; but under United Kingdom law, they may be waived, albeit this 
requires writing.  Further, the paternity right must be “asserted” before it can 
apply, and it is not generally available to authors whose works are created in the 
course of employment.33  In these ways, British moral rights are weaker than the 
systems found, for example, in some other EU member states.  
The Commission working paper, however, consistently with the emphasis 
generally placed on the economic in European reforms, sees “no apparent need 
to harmonise moral rights protection at this stage”.34     TRIPS and the WCT, the 
most recent harmonising instruments at a global level, make no mention of moral 
rights, and the subject is in general underplayed in international negotiations.  
Yet in the continental European legal tradition, at least, moral rights are plainly an 
important aspect of copyright, protecting significant interests.  David Vaver has 
argued that a strong moral rights regime is in the public interest, on the following 
grounds:
 A trade mark-like function of assuring the public as to the origin and 
quality of the work
                                                
33 For all this see Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, Part 1 Chapter IV.
34 Above, note 1, para 3.5.
23
23
 Social reward going to where it belongs
 Cultural preservation, helping maintain the record of the country’s 
culture
 Author empowerment in connection with the exploitation of their 
work.35
The rights may be considered particularly significant in an online world 
where works can be speedily and endlessly transmitted and retransmitted, 
readily modified and re-shaped, and integrated, in whole or in part, in other 
works.  Even if economic interests in the digital environment can be as effectively 
defended by way of contract as by copyright, it is much less clear that this is so 
with the moral rights, since it will not necessarily be the author who is making the 
product available to the public (contractually or otherwise).  
A further argument draws on the link between moral rights and 
fundamental human rights which underlie many personality rights in general.  
Human rights to dignity and respect seem particularly apt to support the right to 
be identified in connection with one’s work and to have that work treated 
appropriately by others.36  Many of the functions of moral rights identified by 
                                                
35 ‘Moral Rights Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow’, (1999) 7 Intl J of Law and 
Information Technology 270.  
36 See further on this theme two papers by Mira T Sundara Rajan: ‘Moral Rights 
in the Digital Age: New Possibilities for the Democratization of Culture’ (2002) 16 
Intl Rev of Law Computers & Technology 187; ‘Moral Rights in Information 
Technology: a New Kind of “Personal Right”?’ ((2004) 12 Intl J of Law and 
Information Technology 32; also Leslie Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, ‘The Moral Right of 
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Vaver could also be of great importance in a world of open access journal 
publishing, and after much debate they are recognised in the Creative Commons 
UK licences for England & Wales and Scotland.  
The issue here is, then, whether in a codification or reform process moral 
rights should be given increased recognition as of especial significance in the 
digital environment.  The European Commission appears to think not, as the 
2004 staff working paper says that “no evidence exists in the digital environment 
either that the current state of affairs does affect the good functioning of the 
Internal Market”.37  But, as we have been arguing, the good functioning of the 
Internal Market is not the only relevant consideration in the reform and 
restatement of copyright in Europe.  
If such arguments are accepted, then also questions may follow about the 
present United Kingdom regime, in particular the position with regard to 
 employment under the paternity right;
 the need to assert paternity right;
 regulation of waivers for unconscionability;
 duration – it is not clear, especially in the light of some of the 
underlying policies referred to above, why there should be a time 
                                                                                                                                                
Integrity: a Freedom of Expression’, in F Macmillan (ed), New Directions in 
Copyright Law vol 2 (forthcoming 2006). 
37 Above note 1, para 3.5.
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limitation on any of the moral rights; on the other hand, moral rights 
which endure beyond an author’s lifetime may be an undue 
limitation of the public domain, putting powers capable of 
amounting to censorship in the hands of persons other than the one 
in whose interest the rights were created;
 the name of the rights, at least in the UK, where ‘moral’ in the 
context of rights tends to suggest, at least to the uninformed, ‘not 
legal’, and so to devalue their significance; ‘author’s personality 
rights’, while cumbersome, might better convey what the law seeks 
to protect here. 
The United Kingdom will introduce artists’ resale rights (droit de suite) in 
2006, following a harmonising Directive in 2001.38  This will guarantee the 
original artist a share of the returns being earned from sales of the original art 
work, regardless of whether the artist still owns the copyright in the work in 
question.  While arguably this is more an economic than a moral right, making it 
legitimate to take account of the potential economic as well as cultural impact of 
doing so, it may also be for consideration whether the underlying principle is 
capable of extension to other areas.  For example, if the employer is the first 
owner of the economic rights of copyright in works produced by employees in the 
course of their employment, is there a case for guaranteeing to the employee a 
right to participate in the economic benefit which the work brings to the 
                                                
38 Parliament and Council Directive 2001/84/EC on the resale right for the benefit 
of the author of an original work of art.
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employer?  An analogy can also be drawn with employee rights in patent law,39
although that scheme does not appear to have been regularly used and is not 
easy to apply.40  However, this may also be because well-advised employers put 
in place suitable or satisfactory schemes of their own devising as part of the 
contract of employment.  Were an employee reward scheme to be introduced 
into copyright, the question of whether it should be a default scheme subject to 
contract would have to be addressed.
(3) Non-producer interests
Our focus to date has been on the producer side of the copyright equation, or in 
the consideration of what the present law seeks to protect by conferring rights.  
But by placing various limitations upon what it protects on the producer side, 
copyright also protects, directly or indirectly, other interests which here we may 
most simply describe as “non-producer” in nature.  Thus -  
 Freedom of expression and information are protected by the limitation of 
copyright to forms of expression, as distinct from the ideas and information 
which are expressed
 Copyright is not unlimited in duration, and works which fall out of copyright 
at the end of their term are available to all for any purpose
                                                
39 Patents Act 1977 ss 39-43.
40 L Bently and B Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (2nd edn, 2004), 567-72.
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 Works which fall below the threshold requirement of “originality” do not 
have copyright, even if in other respects they come within one of the 
categories of protected work (e.g. being written, they are literary).
 Works which do not fit into the expressed categories of the law do not 
receive copyright protection (e.g. the format and catchphrases of the TV 
show “Opportunity Knocks” did not amount to a dramatic work and so did 
not receive copyright protection41)
 The copyright exceptions, whether general – e.g. fair dealing for private 
study, non-commercial research, or news reporting – or for specific types 
of work – e.g. decompilation of computer programs, “time-shifting” of TV 
broadcasts – reflect a recognition that certain non-producer interests 
outweigh producer ones in at least some circumstances; or at any rate the 
impracticability of certain kinds of copyright enforcement. 
 The product embodying the protected work can generally be dealt with 
freely by the first and subsequent purchasers apart from integrity / 
commercial rental / lending rights. 
Cumulatively, these aspects of the law amount to what is often called the “public 
domain”.  The advantage of a copyright law over a contractual regime is that it 
gives the notion of “public domain” some genuine consistency and coherence.  
But in some ways “public domain” is an unhelpful phrase, since it can also be 
                                                
41 Green v Broadcasting Corp of New Zealand [1989] 2 All ER 1056 (PC).  This 




applied without abuse of language or law to material which is simply published or 
publicly available, whether or not it is also in copyright, and whether or not the 
user has to pay for its use.  In thinking through the purposes served by copyright, 
however, the scope of the area which copyright does not reach, and the reasons 
(if any) why it does not do so, need to be part of the discussion and carefully 
weighed in the overall balance.   Thus, for example, we need to address the 
argument that copyright exceptions exist principally to deal with market failures, 
areas of activity in which the creation of an efficient market where producers and 
users could bargain effectively seemed impossible or far too expensive; and that 
the Internet now provides the solution with hugely reduced transaction costs, 
making exceptions un-necessary.42  In opaque and rather unsatisfactory fashion 
the Information Society Directive has tried to point a way forward for the time 
being, by granting member states the power to ensure that DRMS are not used 
to prevent those with lawful access to a copyright work from having the benefit of 
copyright exceptions and limitations.43  It remains to be seen how effectively this 
power will be wielded, and whether the underlying principle can also be applied 
to prevent DRMS cutting off access to, and use of, out-of-copyright and other 
public domain material; but its existence is at least recognition that rights are not 
absolute, and that other interests are in play. 
(4) Conclusion
                                                
42 See e.g. Tom W Bell, ‘Fair Use vs. Fared Use: the Impact of Automated Rights 
Management on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine’ (1998) 76 North Carolina LR 557. 
43 European Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29/EC, art 6(4). 
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To summarise the arguments of this section of the paper: the reform and 
possible codification of copyright needs to take account of all the interests 
involved in the law, and not simply the economic ones which seem to be in the 
forefront of official thinking, important and powerful though those are.  In 
particular there is a need to engage with the personality- and culture-related 
claims of individual creators, and to recognise that the limitations hitherto placed 
upon copyright have served interests which are also important to the economic 
and cultural wellbeing of society as a whole.  The status quo is not necessarily 
where we wish to remain; but it provides the platform upon which we should seek 
to build. 
C. CUMULATION ISSUES
Copyright sits alongside other forms of intellectual property right and the same 
subject matter can be potentially the subject of two or more rights.  A codification 
of copyright has to decide how to address this problem.  Should there be a 
rigorous scheme of one subject-matter, one right; or should overlap be permitted,
and if so, to what extent, since the overlapping rights may in fact be 
contradictory, either as a matter of substance or in terms of the policies being 
pursued through the two regimes?  Similar questions arise inside copyright itself, 
since it categorises different kinds of work in order (usually) to grant them 
different kinds of right.  
(1) Copyright and other intellectual property rights
30
30
The facts that copyright comes into existence with the relevant work (including 
possibly when the work is still in process of completion), and that as a result of 
the Berne Convention it takes a potentially world-wide effect for 50 years or 
more, but without any immediately necessary extra costs, makes it an 
enormously attractive right for investors of all kinds in new works.  Thus at points 
where copyright may overlap with other forms of intellectual property, particularly 
where the other form requires registration, with its attendant costs (e.g. patents, 
trade marks, registered designs), the would-be right-owner may well be tempted 
to prefer copyright; and where a court sees a deserving producer being “ripped 
off” by a copyist, copyright may be the readiest tool at hand with which to tackle 
the problem.  “What is worth copying is worth protecting.”44  
Cornish has remarked upon “a fundamental difference of attitude” towards 
the cumulation problem: either intellectual property rights are to be seen as a set 
of specific exceptions to a general freedom of action and competition, in which 
case cumulation needs to be tackled and eliminated where possible; or 
intellectual property is a general protection for innovators against free riders, and 
the cumulation of rights is simply a useful additional weapon for the right-holder 
in that ongoing struggle.45  But, whichever view is taken in general, difficulties 
have undoubtedly resulted on occasion at least from too great willingness to 
resort to copyright and consequent potential overlaps of protection with other 
                                                
44 University of London Press v University Tutorial Press [1916] 2 Ch 601 at 610 
(per Peterson J)
45 ‘Cumulation and Convergence of Intellectual Property Rights’, in P Mirfield and 
R Smith (eds), Essays for Colin Tapper (2003), 204. 
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forms of intellectual property.  The best-known example is the development of 
copyright in the field of industrial design between 1965 and 1985, as a result of 
which the policy of design law became badly distorted.  This was put right (more 
or less) by the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, which sought, with 
some success, to expel copyright from the domain of product design.46  Again, 
protection for single words, titles, catchphrases, computer menu commands and 
the like might have caused the courts less unease with a firm approach that 
these were protectable, if at all, only as trade marks, or by the law of passing 
off.47  
Current issues in this area involve computer programs, databases and, 
once more, industrial designs.  
With computer programs, copyright is the principal form of intellectual 
property protection; but patents, having been excluded from computer programs 
“as such”, have been granted for computer programs if they have technical 
effects (whatever that may be decided to mean).  The proposed Directive on the 
patentability of computer-implemented inventions, intended to “clarify” the law in 
this area, has now been decisively rejected by the European Parliament,48 but 
                                                
46 The history is explained in H L MacQueen, Copyright, Competition and 
Industrial Design (2nd edn, 1995). 
47 See e.g. Exxon Corporation v Exxon Insurance Consultants International Ltd






further fresh proposals can be expected from the Commission in the not too 
distant future.  It is clear that software patent monopolies have the potential to 
run into conflict with software copyright rules, in particular the rules established 
by the Software Directive allowing for such actions as making back-up copies 
and decompilation to achieve interoperability between an independently created 
program and other programs.49  These copyright rules are not readily compatible 
with patent exceptions permitting private acts for non-commercial purposes or 
acts for experimental purposes relating to the subject-matter of the invention.50
Recital 22 of the now rejected Software Patents Directive, as set out in the 
Common Position of the Council in November 2004, said:
The rights conferred by patents granted for inventions within the scope of 
this Directive should not affect acts permitted under Articles 5 and 6 of 
Directive 91/250/EEC, in particular under the provisions thereof in respect 
of decompilation and interoperability. In particular, acts which, under 
Articles 5 and 6 of Directive 91/250/EEC, do not require authorisation of 
the rightholder with respect to the rightholder's copyrights in or pertaining 
to a computer program, and which, but for those Articles, would require 
such authorisation, should not require authorisation of the rightholder with 
respect to the rightholder's patent rights in or pertaining to the computer 
program. 
                                                
49 Council Directive 91/250/EC, arts 5 and 6. 
50 Patents Act 1977 s 60(5). 
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This was then given effect in draft Article 6:
Relationship with Directive 91/250/EEC
The rights conferred by patents granted for inventions within the scope of 
this Directive shall not affect acts permitted under Articles 5 and 6 of 
Directive 91/250/EEC in particular under the provisions thereof in respect 
of decompilation and interoperability. 
While the draft Directive thus awkwardly provided for a form of cohabitation 
between patent rights and copyright exceptions, it did not address the much 
more fundamental question of whether dual protection should be allowed at all.  
Some discomfort over this was part of why the Directive fell foul of the 
parliamentarians in Strasbourg.
With databases the issue is one created by the Database Directive 1996.51  
Under it, a database may be protected by copyright if its selection and 
arrangement constitute an intellectual creation (a super-originality test).52  The 
Database Directive also introduced an additional, sui generis database right to 
protect those commercially valuable and expensively created databases 
henceforth to be excluded from copyright by the higher originality requirement.  
The principal ground for database right protection is the creator’s substantial 
investment in obtaining, verifying or preserving the contents of the database, and it 
is immaterial whether or not the database is also a copyright work, i.e. is an 
                                                
51 European Parliament and Council Directive 96/9/EC.
52 Ibid, art 3(1). 
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intellectual creation of the compiler in its selection or arrangement.53  But a 
copyright database is not precluded from also enjoying database right, the 
relevance of this being that database right confers protection against extraction 
and re-utilisation of the contents of the database (i.e. the information in it), rather 
than the copyright protection for the structure of the contents.54  Further, as the 
Commission’s 2004 working paper acknowledges, the differences between the 
copyright and the sui generis exceptions may mean that the former can be 
undermined by the rights existing under the latter.55  At the least there appears to 
be a recipe for confusion in the present law.  Once again, the question of the 
desirability of dual protection arises.
The problem with industrial designs arises first because the Designs 
Directive 199856 and Community Designs Regulation 200157 greatly expanded the 
concept of a registrable design by comparison with the previous United Kingdom 
law.  Two-dimensional items, such as graphic symbols, became products in their 
                                                
53 Ibid, art 7.
54 See Database Directive arts 3, 5, 7.  See further on the apparently limited 
protection conferred by the sui generis right the decisions of the European Court 
of Justice: Case C-46/02 Fixtures Marketing Ltd v Oy Veikkaus AB [2004] ECR I-
10365; Case-C 203/02 British Horseracing Board v William Hill Organization Ltd
Case [2004] ECR I-10415; Case C-338/02 Fixtures Marketing Ltd v Svenska 
Spel AB [2004] ECR I-10497; and Case C-444/02 Fixtures Marketing Ltd v OPAP
[2004] ECR I-10549; and the aftermath of the BHB v Hill case in the Court of 
Appeal, reported at [2005] RPC 35. 
55 Above, note 1, para 2.1.3.2. See also the Report of the Royal Society (London), 
Keeping Science Open (2003), chapter 5 (accessible at 
http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/policy (click on ‘Policy statement and reports’, then on 
‘2003’). 
56 European Parliament and Council Directive 98/71/EC.
57 Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002. 
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own right alongside the more traditional three-dimensional kind.58  While graphic 
design could have claimed protection under the old United Kingdom law as pattern 
or ornamentation if applied to a three-dimensional product, registration was denied 
to items of a primarily literary or artistic character where the article was no more 
than a carrier for the design.  Copyright was expected to provide the necessary 
protection.  So the pattern of words and lines on a football pools coupon was not 
a registrable design, since the paper which constituted the article to which the 
design was applied had no function other than to carry the design. 59  The result 
would now be different, even although the pools coupon also has copyright.60  On 
the other hand the design applied to wallpaper, curtains, chair covers or bed 
linen would have been registrable under the old law and continues to be so now; 
it also has copyright.61
Similar overlaps can arise with three-dimensional products within the 
scope of artistic copyright, such as sculptures, works of artistic craftsmanship 
and, perhaps most significant of all, works of architecture.  The indeterminate 
word “item” which appears in the definition of “product” in the new law certainly 
does not by itself limit the concept to goods or corporeal moveables.  Sculptures 
(but not works of artistic craftsmanship) were definitely excluded from registration 
                                                
58 Designs Directive, art 1(b); Community Designs Regulation, art 3(b). Note that 
computer programs are specifically excluded from the definition of “product”, so 
they are not eligible for a third form of IP protection.  But there are questions 
about whether, for example, screen displays are caught by the exclusion. 
59 Littlewood’s Pools Ltd’s Application (1949) 66 RPC 309. 
60 Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football)Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 273 (HL). 
61 See e.g. Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd [2001] FSR 11 
(HL) (fabric designs). 
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under the old law, but seem to epitomise a work of “handicraft” which can be 
protected under the new law.  
The cumulation problems at the copyright/registered designs interface are 
addressed with in the United Kingdom legislation: first, by excluding copyright as 
far as possible; and, second, where copyright cannot be excluded, by aligning its 
results with those of registered designs law, again so far as possible.62  In 
simplified terms, making an article to the design or copying another article made 
to the design is not an infringement of copyright; such production of articles is to 
be regulated under designs law.  There is still difficulty: to have copyright the 
design must be embodied in a design document or model, and for these 
purposes design is defined as merely “any aspect of the shape or configuration 
(whether internal or external) of the whole or part of an article, other than surface 
decoration”.63  But, as discussed above, registered designs protection now
reaches beyond three-dimensional shape or configuration, and it is therefore 
arguable that design features which are registered but which are not shape and 
configuration still also have full artistic copyright, even against three-dimensional 
reproduction.64  But the United Kingdom legislation has a failsafe at this point: if 
                                                
62 See generally Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, ss 51-53; Copyright 
(Industrial Process and Excluded Articles) (No 2) Order 1989 (SI 1989/1070). 
63 Ibid, s 51(3). 
64 See further on this Lambretta Clothing Co Ltd v Teddy Smith (UK) Ltd [2005] 
RPC 6 (CA), an unregistered design right case where a similar question had to 
be addressed.  A claim to full artistic copyright in the “trackways” of colouring in a 
retro track top (which had been denied unregistered design right because not 
shape or configuration) was also denied.  Mance LJ dissented on a reading of the 
statute which is persuasive to this reader, at least; but Jacob and Sedley LJJ took 
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non-shape/configuration features of a registered design are exploited, by or with 
the licence of the copyright owner, by making articles commercially, then the 
copyright period will not run for the usual author’s lifetime plus 70 years.  Instead 
the copyright so far as concerns making articles to that design will expire 25 
years after the first marketing of such articles, that is, at the end of a period 
equivalent to the maximum time for protection under the registration system.65  If, 
on the other hand, the infringing exploitation is non-commercial, registered 
designs law would not avail its owner in such circumstances, and copyright can 
be given its head. 
The general issue here appears to be one of basic policy with regard to 
cumulation: are overlapping rights to be avoided or not?  Should there be a 
general provision – or at least a presumption - in intellectual property law that a 
claim to one form of protection (whether at registration stage or in infringement 
proceedings in court) precludes any other form of protection for the work in 
question, at least if the claim is successful?  The immediate impact of this would 
be with regard to the development of a new Software Patent Directive, and the 
review of the Database Directive.  With regard to the latter, it would also raise the 
question of whether databases should be protected by copyright OR by a sui 
generis right, and if the latter, how, if at all, that should be reformulated.66  Or is 
                                                                                                                                                
what they regarded as the common sense position, whatever the statute might 
say. 
65 Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 52.
66 Note the Commission’s Communication, Evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on the 
Legal Protection of Databases Brussels 9.8.2005, which suggests that the sui 
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cumulation inevitable?  It certainly appears to be so in the context of design 
protection,67 but this leads to tortuous law designed to keep the two apart and, so 
far as this cannot be done, in line with each other.  It is not a pretty sight. 
(2) Cumulation within copyright
There are also issues of cumulation within copyright itself.  Many products in the 
copyright domain are likely to enjoy more than one copyright, often with each one 
having a different owner.  Thus a book will have copyright as a literary work, but 
there will also be a copyright in its typographical arrangement, as would also be 
the case with printed dramatic scripts and musical scores.  A database has 
copyright in the selection and arrangement of its contents, but this does not affect 
any copyright that items of content may have in their own right.  A sound recording 
of a piece of music will involve copyrights, not only in the sound recording as such, 
but also, separately, one in the music.  And if the work recorded is a song, there 
will be a further copyright in the song lyrics.68   A broadcast of a film or sound 
recording will have copyright as a broadcast, but this will leave unaffected the 
                                                                                                                                                
generis right has failed to achieve its objective of boosting the global 
competitiveness of the European database industry (although the UK continues 
to be the leading member state in the field).  It is understood that abolition of the 
right is one of the options under consideration by the Commission, along with 
revision of the Directive, or doing nothing, simply awaiting further judicial 
decisions (the last being the likeliest outcome)
67 Unless separate design protection was abolished altogether, which seems 
most unlikely. 
68 There are also performers’ rights to be considered, increasingly similar to 
copyright in content. In some contexts, such as popular music, the performer’s 
contribution may be much more important to the success of a work than the 
composer of the music or the lyricist. 
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copyrights in the film or sound recording.  While the sound track accompanying a 
film is treated as part of the film for copyright purposes, a copyright may also 
subsist in the sound track as a sound recording.  
The difficulty which arises from this is the variability of the copyrights which 
may exist in a product, meaning that while one element is in the public domain, 
another is not.  This could have the undesirable effects of damaging the remaining 
copyright interest in the work in question; or inhibiting its appropriate free use; or 
simply confusing people.  The issue was focused in the summer of 2004 by the 
debate about the copyright term in sound recordings.  While the right in recordings 
made in, say, 1954 would expire from 1 January 2005, the rights in the recorded 
music and song lyrics would continue until 70 years after the deaths of the 
respective authors.  There was thus no danger at all of a rash of unauthorised 
issues of copies of old recordings, since that would also involve copying and 
issuing to the public works that were still in copyright (further, copyrights that 
presumably would often be held by the recording companies rather than the 
original authors).  A question of policy may therefore be whether, when a product 
enjoys multiple copyrights, these ought to stand and fall together, at least in 
relation to products of the kind in question; and this, whatever the duration of the 
rights may finally be. 69
                                                
69 Note also the Commission 2004 working paper (above note 1), para 2.2.3.2, 
on “Criteria for calculating the term of protection in the musical sector”, observing 
that some member states treat songs as works of joint authorship between 
lyricist and composer, others (including the UK) as two distinct works with 
different authors; meaning that the copyright term is very variable in the EU.  The 
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In a number of recent cases the English courts have held that a work may 
belong to more than one of the categories into which works are divided in the 
copyright legislation.  So, for example, electronic circuit diagrams have been held 
to be both literary and artistic works,70 while a film has been held to be also a 
dramatic work.71  As Laddie J has observed, this is a different point from the one 
that a single product may embody several copyrights:  
[A]lthough different copyrights can protect simultaneously a particular 
product and an author can produce more than one copyright work during 
the course of a single episode of creative effort, for example a competent 
musician may write the words and the music for a song at the same time, 
it is quite another thing to say that a single piece of work by an author 
gives rise to two or more copyrights in respect of the same creative effort.  
In some cases the borderline between one category of copyright work and 
another may be difficult to define, but that does not justify giving to the 
author protection in both categories.  The categories of copyright work are, 
to some extent, arbitrarily defined.  In the case of a borderline work, I think 
                                                                                                                                                
paper raises the possibility that the term for such works as a whole should 
always be calculated in relation to the last-surviving author.
70 Anacon Corp Ltd v Environmental Research Technology Ltd [1994] FSR 659; 
Electronic Techniques (Anglia) Ltd v Critchley Components Ltd [1997] FSR 401; 
Sandman v Panasonic UK Ltd [1998] FSR 651.  Note that there is also a 
cumulation problem here involving UK unregistered design right, which has been 
(controversially) held applicable to electronic circuit diagrams: Mackie Designs v 
Behringer Specialised Studio Equipment (UK) Ltd [1999] RPC 717. 
71 Norowzian v Arks Ltd (No 2) [2000] FSR 363. 
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there are compelling arguments that the author must be confined to one or 
other of the possible categories.  The proper category is that which most 
nearly suits the characteristics of the work in issue.72
From a taxonomic point of view there must be much to be said for this 
approach; what after all is the point of having categories in law if they are not 
mutually exclusive?  And if they are not mutually exclusive, or fail to capture 
particular types of work adequately, should the categorisation not be abandoned 
or re-thought?  Thus, for example, the Berne Convention requires protection of 
“literary and artistic work”,73 which includes “every production in the literary, 
scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its 
expression”;74 this is followed by an illustrative list, while elsewhere, and only so 
to speak incidentally, the Convention refers to dramatic, musical and 
cinematographic works.75  French law speaks of “works of the mind whatever 
their kind, form of expression, merit or purpose” and gives thereafter an 
illustrative list.76  The principle of Occam’s razor might usefully be applied: 
categories are not to be multiplied un-necessarily in copyright law, and perhaps 
the present United Kingdom statute is guilty of that offence.  
                                                
72 Electronic Techniques (Anglia) Ltd v Critchley Components Ltd [1997] FSR 
401, 413. 
73 Berne Convention, art 1. 
74 Ibid, art 2.1. 
75 Ibid, arts 4, 11, 13 and 14bis.
76 Intellectual Property Code Art L 112-1, 2.  More specific provision has to be 
made for the neighbouring rights of performers, and producers of phonograms, 




I want to conclude this paper with some comments on the potential for an 
academic contribution to the process of reform and possible codification with 
which I began.  That contribution need not be confined to the fairly high-level 
questions to which I have been addressing myself.  Nor need it limit itself to 
comment on the policy and other issues on which much further detailed research 
is required.
A model for possible work which I have in mind is drawn from experience 
over the last 25 years in the field of contract law.  In 1980 the Vienna Convention 
on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) was concluded.  It dealt with many but 
by no means all issues of contract law.  Academics throughout Europe have 
spent much of the ensuing quarter-century in developing and completing systems 
of contract law on the basis of CISG, structured rather in the manner of codes or 
restatements on the US model.  The best-known of these, in which I was 
involved myself as the Scottish representative from 1995, was the Commission 
on European Contract Law headed by Professor Ole Lando of Denmark.  In 2003 
the Commission finally published the complete Principles of European Contract 
Law (PECL).77  Four years before, the Lando Commission had in effect given 
birth to the Study Group on a European Civil Code, which has since been 
working in the same way on a number of other areas of private law such as 
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sales, services contracts, tort, unjustified enrichment and trusts.  The first fruits of 
its work will be published in 2005 or 2006, and the project in its current form was 
due to be completed in 2007.78
Now, however, what seemed to be an entirely academic venture, albeit 
one which had the hope that it might some day influence legal development in 
the European Union, has become something much more significant.  In July 
2001 the European Commission issued a Communication to the Council and the 
European Parliament on European Contract Law,79 seeking views on whether 
problems result from divergences in contract law between Member States and 
whether the proper functioning of the Internal Market might be hindered by 
problems in relation to the conclusion, interpretation and application of cross-
border contracts.  The Commission was also interested in whether different 
national contract laws discourage or increase the costs of cross-border 
transactions.  If concrete problems were identified, the Commission also wanted 
views on possible solutions, such as –
 leaving it to the market;
 promotion of the development of non-binding contract law principles 
such as the Principles of European Contract Law;
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 review and improvement of existing EC legislation (the acquis) in the 
area to make it more coherent and/or adaptable;
 adoption of a European contract code at EC level.
In February 2003 the Commission issued a further Communication to the 
European Parliament and Council entitled A More Coherent European Contract 
Law: An Action Plan.80  The Communication suggested a mix of non-regulatory 
and regulatory measures in order to solve the problems identified by its previous 
consultation, including –
 increasing the coherence of the Community acquis in contract law 
by means of what was called a Common Frame of Reference 
(CFR) for contract law; 
 promoting the elaboration of EU-wide general contract terms; 
 examining further whether problems in European contract law 
require non-sector-specific solutions such as an optional instrument 
on the subject.
A further Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and Council, entitled European Contract Law and the revision of the 
acquis: the way forward was published in October 2004.81  The proposal for the 
development of a CFR is to be taken forward as a means of improving the quality 
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and consistency of the acquis in the area of contract law.  The CFR is seen as a 
toolbox towards improvement of the quality and coherence of the acquis and 
future legislation, as well as its simplification.  “The CFR will provide clear 
definitions of legal terms, fundamental principles and coherent model rules of 
contract law, drawing on the EC acquis and on best solutions found in Member 
States’ legal orders”.82  It will however be a non-binding instrument, although the 
Commission reserved the right to consult again on this question when 
elaborating the CFR.  The promotion of EU-wide standard terms and conditions 
is to be taken forward via a website which will be a platform for the exchange of 
information on such terms and conditions.  Further, and in parallel with the 
development of the CFR, the Commission will continue to investigate the 
opportuneness of a non-sectoral-specific optional instrument on European 
contract law.  
In June 2005 the Commission contracted under the Sixth Framework 
programme with a number of groups, to carry out the research needed for the 
preparation and elaboration of the CFR by 2007.  The groups involved, known 
collectively as the CoPECL-Network of Excellence, include the Study Group on a 
European Civil Code and the Research Group on the Existing EC Private Law 
(the Acquis Group).  Most of the Network groups are university-based.  In order 
therefore to avoid the reproach of being merely an academic exercise, the work 
of the groups is being discussed and criticised in “stakeholder workshops” over 
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the study period, the stakeholders including representatives of business, 
consumers and legal practice. The overall aim will be to adopt a tried and tested 
CFR by 2009. 
What can be seen here is a set of academic projects which set out to 
influence the law, not as marginal critics on the sidelines, but as proponents of 
well developed alternative models; and which were available when the critical 
moment arrived and the Commission began to take the idea of a European 
contract law seriously.  The Commission has evidently already begun to take a 
European copyright law seriously, so academic copyright lawyers may not have 
the luxury of the time that by chance was afforded to their contract colleagues.  
But copyright projects akin to the Lando Contract Commission and the Study 
Group on a European Civil Code are not unthinkable and would probably not 
need so much time, given the amount of research and knowledge that has 
already gone into comparative copyright law in Europe as a result of the various 
Directives on different aspects of the subject.  There are models that can be 
followed, therefore, and opportunity exists in the form of the Seventh Framework 
programme.  It is up to us now to seize the day. 
